This paper examines the strategies of Russian households for choosing either the formal or informal banking sector as a source of credit. We aim to learn why households refuse to become clients of a bank and prefer to instead raise funds by borrowing from individuals -friends, colleagues, relatives, and other private parties. We use the results of "Monitoring the Financial Behavior of the Population" (2009)(2010), a national survey of Russian households. Our results suggest that a household's choice of the informal credit market is based not only on economic factors, but also on some institutional ones, including financial literacy, trust in the banking sector, and credit discipline. We show that choosing the informal market is explained by a lack of financial literacy, measured by mathematical competence and home accounting, as well as by a lack of trust in the banking sector as a whole. Borrowers from private parties demonstrate a higher degree of credit discipline: those who believe that repaying a loan is not obligatory are less frequently among informal borrowers and they choose the bank credit market. Our findings, however, are still in line with credit rationing theory. We show that better financial conditions reduce a household's probability to use both formal and informal credit markets in favor of pure bank borrowing.
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Introduction
According to inter-temporal choice theory -one of the fundamental theories of economic agent financial behavior -and, in particular, life-cycle theory (see, for instance, Modigliani, Brumberg, 1954) , households smooth their consumption over time by a combination of saving and borrowing funds under certain conditions during certain stages of their life. Numerous empirical studies are devoted to the problem of defining the determinants of a household's choice of a saving strategy. 4 However, only a few studies examine the factors influencing a household's choice of a borrowing strategy, and even less are devoted to analyzing this question in developing economies 5 . The latter, however, provides no answer to the key issue of how a household chooses its source of borrowed funds when they have banks and non-banking lenders at their disposal.
When considering the case of Russia -an economy in transition -three stylized facts should be emphasized. First of all, in Russia we observe a rapidly growing market for retail bank loans, Consumer loans make up a large proportion of retail loans in Russia. In contrast to large and long-term loans, such as mortgages, these loans can be used in a variety of ways and have different terms and maturities, making it the most popular type of bank credit in Russia. The proportion of consumer loans amounts to 67-75% of total retail loans and has been quite stable over time. High consumer demand makes the coexistence of banks and non-banking lenders possible in this segment of the credit market. Indeed, both can provide types of loans.
Secondly, although the Russian banking sector is now falling after the consumer lending boom, in pursuit of increasing market share and assets sometimes banks seem to choose quantity at the expense of quality, which can lead to serious problems with their credit portfolio.
The ratio of non-performing loans, which declined during the post-crisis years after a peak of 19.7 percent in the 3 rd quarter of 2009, began to rise in 2012. By the end of the year, the total portfolio quality had slightly improved, but the NPL ratio for consumer loans, which exceeds the average ratio (with the exception of mid-2010), continued to increase, amounting to approximately 10.5 percent by the end of the year (see figure 2 ). 5 Thirdly, the results of a recent national household survey conducted by the HSE and WCIOM 6 show that approximately 14 percent of Russian households -or more than a half of all borrowers -borrow money from the informal sector, namely from private individuals such as relatives, friends, colleagues, etc. 7 What are the reasons behind this choice? Perhaps credit rationing in the form of banks refusing to grant loans? Or maybe it is the personal decision of the borrowers themselves? The answer is not that obvious given the increasing share of nonperforming loans. It seems that bank selection procedures are not so strict that credit rationing would fully explain the predominance of borrowing from informal lenders.
Figure 2. Share of non-performing loans (%)
To be precise, there are at least three possible reasons as to why a borrower is in the informal market: a) credit rationing, which is when, considering its current and expected future financial position, a household either receives just partial funding from a bank, or gets refused altogether;
b) other supply-side constraints, varying from the inconvenience of bank locations to the underdevelopment of the financial sector as a whole and high costs of entering the market; c) borrower's choice, including financial literacy and credit discipline (an informal loan is a less sophisticated product, and often times there are no collateral requirement or formal sanctions for non-repayment), unwillingness to be a formal debtor, a desire to remain in the "shadow", and so on.
In this paper we shed some light on which of these factors cause Russian households to avoid becoming bank clients and prefer to borrow from individuals -friends, colleagues, relatives, and other private parties -when deciding to raise borrowed funds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II we review the existing studies that provide possible explanations for a borrower's choice, while Section III describes our data and methodology, followed by Section IV, which discuss our results, and section V, which concludes.
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There are two main sources of borrowed funds examined in the academic literature: banks and the alternative-banking sector. The latter includes any legal financial activities outside formal financial regulation. This can be professional and non-professional lenders, private financial firms, pawnshops, households, etc. The key feature is the fact that most of these lenders do not raise capital and use their own savings (Chandravarkar, 1987) . Due to the specifics of loans granted by private parties, we identify these loans in a separate category of informal loans, separating this type of credit relationship from all others in the alternative banking sector 8 . From an economic point of view, this type of credit is the most desirable for households as it does not involve commissions, collateral, and, in some cases, sanctions for non-repayment of the loan.
However, households do not always have the desire to borrow from private parties, because of the priority to maintain good relations with friends and family, which may be damaged in case of problems with repayment. Also, this may not be possible due to a lack of savings among family and friends. However, this type of lending is a significant source of funds. For example, a household survey in Canada shows that households turn to the following methods to raise additional funds needed in the current period: 28 percent of households borrow from relatives and friends, 26 percent reduce their current consumption, 10 percent use credit cards or take payment advances, 7 percent use the funds within the credit line or overdraft, and 32 percent choose other means of financing, such as turning to alternative banking services or selling assets (Arrowsmith, Pignal, 2010) . According to the results of a similar study conducted in the USA, 51.9 percent of respondents replied positively to having borrowed from friends and family over the past 12 months, additionally acknowledging that most of the debts were not returned in time (Mckean, Lessem, Bax, 2005) .
What factors might influence the decision to become a borrower? For example, studies conducted in Italy show that the probability of entering the credit market is in direct relation with the household's size and level of income. The greatest demand for loans is among households consisting of young and well-educated individuals, who are at an early stage of their careers and do not have sufficient funds to purchase expensive assets, but who do have higher expected future incomes (Magri, Pico, Rampazzi, 2011) . Besides, the demand for credit increases with the age of the head of the household, up to a maximum of 30 years, and then decreases. Also, 7 another important factor affecting the decision to take a loan is a household's net wealth, equaling the value of personal assets minus liabilities. A growth in household wealth stimulates it to finance its own expenses itself, and the demand for credit decreases at a rate that is higher when wealth is more liquid. On the other hand, the change over to a higher standard of living can lead to a significant increase in needs, and, consequently, to an increase in demand for credit.
The impact of net wealth is determined by the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption, which is the ratio between the marginal utility of consumption in two periods. The marginal rate of substitution is the highest at low levels of wealth and income, declines as it approaches the average standard of living, and then increases again (Magri, 2002 ).
There are a few studies analyzing the characteristics of households who choose the informal banking sector. Their results suggest that the parameters of informal loans prove that this source of funds addresses poor households. Small amounts and maturities of loans imply the use of credit to cover immediate needs (food, clothing, and medical care), where a lack of funds at times of relevant need occurs only in low-income households. For example, a survey of households in 1994 in Madagascar shows that most loans in the informal sector (62.5 percent)
were used for current consumption, and a significant number of credits in the formal sector (57.4 percent) were used for purchasing equipment and machinery (Zeller M. 1994 ).
And there is the quite understandable opinion that informal lenders who offer such unfavorable conditions for themselves are only pursuing the goal of altruism -they are sincerely takeing care of the borrower's well-being. Lee and Persson (2012) built two models of moral hazard for formal and family finance in which a family lender differs from a formal lender only in that he has an altruistic relationship. The model suggests that informal loans have social ramifications that discourage risk taking, because borrowers are averse to imposing risks on family and friends. Thus, the probability to lose the social relationship with a lender imposes strong incentives and significantly reduces the problem of moral hazard.
There are several reasons for households to decide to not borrow from the traditional banking sector and to choose an alternative way of financing: refusal of banks (credit rationing due to a negative credit history, lack of collateral, low income, or unemployment), lack of financial literacy (an inability to calculate the costs and benefits, and difficulties in understanding banking products and in communicating with bank employees), unfavorable terms (banks cannot offer low rates to borrowers with a high risk), and inconvenient bank locations (for example, a lack of offices in rural areas) (Caskey,1994 However, not only economic factors, such as household income and related rationing, serve as a reason against using bank loans and preferring informal loans. The behavior of people in real life is very different from generally accepted economic models of rational decision-making in intertemporal choice. For example, the concept of bounded rationality offers an explanation for the fact that households are ready to pay more to get a fast and convenient loan (Ramsay, 2000) . We can find some confirmation in a study examining the behavior of low-income households in Detroit in the USA, where markets for alternative financial services have experienced rapid growth, being popular even among those who actively use traditional banking services. Respondents explain that these loans are "easier to obtain and use" (Barr, Dokko, Keys B, 2009). Indeed, the alternative market works faster, so it has a certain advantage (Tatom, Godsted, 2011 having a larger household, having one or more children, the head of the household having a higher education, and his or her formal employment. The converse is also true, the less of these features a household has, the more often it will turn to the informal sector.
Finally, there are several explanations for the coexistence of the formal and informal financial sector. On the one hand, the latter solves problems caused by underdevelopment and other restrictions of the former one. On the other hand, it can be considered as an autonomous sector, which has a comparative advantage in low transaction costs and easy monitoring.
Transaction costs there are much lower because of a lack of regulators demanding documents, no need for multiple personnel, facilities, and equipment, and fewer problems with collateral, which is either not available or highly liquid (Chandravarkar, 1987) .
However, the informal and traditional financial sectors are not perfect substitutes since they offer different credit arrangements. A study conducted in Malawi (Diagne, 1999) shows that setting a fixed time for fulfilling obligations in the informal sector sharply reduced demand for credit, and thus increased the amount of loans in the formal sector.
In Russia, borrowing from relatives and friends seems to be the preferred way to obtain necessary funds. According to a 2002 survey of households, these loans were used by 41.5 percent of respondents, while only 17 percent of respondents turned to banks (Strebkov, 2005) .
The most important factor in getting a loan from relatives is the ability to repay the loan.
Respondents also emphasized trust in a potential borrower as another important factor. 10 Individuals who are between 31 and 44 years of age demonstrate the greatest demand for loans, which may be explained by stable earnings and confidence in their future.
A strategy that implies "living within one's means" is a matter of pride for some individuals, so they basically refuse to borrow from anyone. But there is another type of household that is so poor that they do not take loans, realizing that, whatever the amount is, they are not able to repay such debts (Strebkov, 2005 ).
According Secondly, we measure differently the financial literacy. We use a set of simpler questions, which allows for fewer missing observations. We choose the questions to cover not only calculation abilities and financial knowledge, but also understanding of riskiness and accounting patterns.
We also do not construct the financial literacy index to see, whether these aspects of financial literacy influence the household choice differently. Thirdly, we go beyond the financial literacy as a determinant of a source of borrowed funds, adding credit discipline and trust to banking sector as another couple of important factors.
Methodology and Data
We use the results of "Monitoring the Financial Behavior of the Population", a survey of households conducted by the HSE and WCIOM in 2009-2010. This is a unique dataset that provides the opportunity to study the financial strategies of Russian households, including their experiences with using different financial services, their attitudes toward banks, financial literacy, and financial culture. The survey includes respondents over 18 years old and the number of respondents is 1600, selected using national multistage stratified random sampling.
We only use the data on borrowers -including borrowers from any sources -as the purpose of this study is to identify the factors influencing a household's choice of informal creditmeaning borrowing from relatives, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and other private partiesinstead of bank loans as a source of debt funds. We suggest that the choice of a specified borrower strategy may depend not only on economic factors (determined, for example, by the refusal of a bank to provide a loan), but also on a range of institutional ones, including financial literacy, credit discipline, trust to banks, and so on.
We examine the choice in two steps. At the first step we estimate a Probit regression with a binary dependent variable (debt_private), which is equal to 1 if a household i owes money to private parties and 0 if a household i borrows solely from banks.
At the second step we widen our understanding of borrower's choice and look separately at the how those who borrow solely from banks are different from those who borrow solely from private parties and those who use a mixture of the two options. We estimate a Multinomial logit model with a dependent variable equal to 0 for pure bank borrowers, 1 for pure private sector borrowers and 2 for households owing to both banks and private parties (multi).
The basic specifications of both models include only economic factors:
(
We introduce the characteristics to a rationing hypothesis (Rationing): current income and expectations for future income. As a proxy for other supply-side restrictions, we include the size of the settlement where a household is based (measured by population, City_type). We also control for standard socio-demographic factors, specifically gender, education, and household We assume that the better a household's current (mat_sit) and expected (welfare_in_year) financial situation, the more likely it will be to borrow from a bank and the less likely it will be to face the problem of rationing. The same is true for households living in big cities (city_type), where banks can be accessed more easily. Moreover, we also assume that the smaller the town, 13 the closer social networks are and thus the higher the probability is to prefer the informal credit market.
Next, we extend the basic model, including one by one various institutional factors that may influence the decision of a borrower. The extended model is as follows:
Existing literature suggests that financial literacy is one of the most important factors influencing the choice of financial strategy and, in particular, the choice of a borrower's strategy.
Financial literacy increases the probability that one will chose to borrow from a bank because it makes it easier to understand the intricacies of banking products.
However, estimating the degree of financial literacy is not a simple task. A respondents opinion of his or her financial literacy may differ from his or her actual knowledge and skills.
Therefore, we estimate financial literacy in two ways: directly, by using a respondent's point of view, and indirectly, by using their answers to questions that describe various aspects of financial literacy, such as financial knowledge, mathematical skills, and attitudes toward risk.
Variables measuring financial literacy are presented in Table 2 . The variable fin_literacy shows a subjective assessment of the level of financial literacy for respondents. On average, respondents think that they have "satisfactory" knowledge in the field of finance. But we also look at indirect indicators of financial literacy. First of all, we introduce a proxy for mathematical skills and knowledge of percentage calculation (per_cents). About two-thirds of respondents possess such financial knowledge. Secondly, accounting for household income and expenses characterizes a respondent's attention to personal finances and control of its volatility (acc). On average, accounting is not kept by respondents who report that they have some general view of financial flows. Finally, perceptions of risk can be revealed using a household's understanding of the "risk-return" dilemma. We introduce a measure of understanding the positive correlation between risk and return in financial markets (risk). About one-third of respondents have a more in-depth financial expertise in terms of risk perception.
Besides financial literacy, other factors, such as credit discipline, trust in financial institutions, and attitudes to owing money to a bank, can influence the decision to take a loan from private parties. Variables describing each of them are presented in Table 3 . The variable return_credit characterizes the credit discipline of a borrower. When asked whether it is acceptable to not repay a loan, a large percentage of the answers were positive, pointing to an absence of credit discipline. We assume that these borrowers are less likely to apply for bank credit because sanctions in the informal market in case of a failure to fulfill obligations may seem less rigid. Lack of confidence in financial institutions (trust_to_fin) may have a positive impact on the probability that one will choosing to borrow from individuals. We assume that the higher the degree of confidence in financial institutions, the less likely it is that 15 one will turn to private individuals for a loan. Another factor determining one's refusal to take out a bank loan is a desire to live within his or her means and to rely on his or her own strength (no_debt_please). Households giving this answer to the related question about reasons to not take out a bank loan, amounting to approximately one third of respondents, would rather turn to the informal market and avoid the official status of being debtor.
Results
Borrowing from the informal market Table 4 represents the results of both the basic (column 1) and extended (columns 2-8) Probit models. Financial literacy, which we expected to play a crucial role in choosing a source of credit, is virtually insignificant, if only subjective measures are considered. Subjective financial literacy reduces the probability that one will use the informal credit market only for respondents who believe to have excellent (5 out of 5) knowledge and skills in the field of finance. For these respondents, the hypothesis about the positive impact of financial literacy on the probability to avoid informal loans is confirmed. This effect has economic significance (appx. 44 percent), but is unstable over specifications. However, such a high assessment of personal financial competence is rather infrequent, as the proportion of these respondents is only 1.5 percent.
This result can be explained by the fact that under financial literacy respondents can understand different types of knowledge, skills, and experience, which do not have the same effect on the probability that one will turn to the informal sector. These features are covered by the results of models with different proxies for objective financial literacy. They show that being able to calculate percentages and related practical mathematical skills influence the choice of borrowers. Respondents who can correctly calculate percentages are less likely to choose the informal sector (the corresponding effect is about 11-13 percent). The component that represents accounting and systematization of financial cash flows within a household is also statistically significant, but the significance is unstable over specifications. The effect, however, is still quite large, accounting for another 12-percent reduction in the probability that one will borrow from private parties.
We also estimated the influence of a borrower's credit discipline, which implicitly characterizes a respondent's willingness to fulfill their financial obligations. The results are quite surprising: households that do not believe one must meet financial obligations or repay loans on 16 time are less likely to borrow from private lenders and, thus, more likely to be among bank clients. The reduction in the probability that one will turn to the informal sector is about 15-18 percent. This could be due to the fact that households are more concerned about their reputation in the eyes of private creditors, such as friends and family, and not about building good credit history.
This effect is non-trivial and suggests that formal economic sanctions -namely bank ones -are less significant than informal sanctions. However, this result corresponds with the theoretical predictions of Lee and Persson (2012) .
Our results show that confidence in financial institutions is an insignificant factor. Thus, we reject the obvious hypothesis that the decision to turn to individuals depends on trust in financial institutions as a whole. The psychological factor is also insignificant; our hypothesis that the reluctance to become a debtor stimulates potential borrowers to choose the informal sector has no confirmation.
Finally, we consider economic factors that control for credit rationing. A better financial situation decreases the probability that one will turn to the informal market. The related effects are large, but decrease over the categories: we observe a 45-53 percent decrease when jumping from the poorest individuals to the next class up, but moving yet one more class up adds only 5-11 percent to that effect, while moving up yet again adds less than 4 percent. This result confirms the rationing theory, and shows that households with a higher income are more likely to finance their needs by bank loans, as a bank's decision, based exclusively on economic characteristics, will be positive. The only exception is the last category -the highest level of well-being, where a household is able to easily buy a car or an apartment: obtained effects are smaller and not always significant. However, these households amount only to 0.5 percent of the sample. A household's future financial situation matters only if the improvement is expected, and this reduces the probability that one will borrow in the informal market by [13] [14] percent. This effect is unstable, however.
Also we found a positive and unstable influence from the type of settlement on the choice of a borrower. Both the supply-side restriction hypothesis and the hypothesis that it is most common to take loans from private parties in small towns were not confirmed. Tables 5 and 6 show the results for the Multinomial Logit, with table 5 comparing pure bank borrowers with pure informal borrowers, and table 6 comparing pure bank borrowers with those who borrow from both banks and private parties. These results show that credit rationing is a serious reason for using the informal credit market if the borrower prefers a mixed strategy. For these households, both the current and expected future financial situations prove to be statistically and economically significant. In addition to the results similar to those from the Probit model, we observe the significance of a stable future financial position (neither improving nor getting worse) and the number of 19 household members (which is also information that the bank can ask for). The former reduces the probability that one will borrow informally in addition to borrowing from a bank, while the latter increases this probability. Both factors support the rationing hypothesis: these borrowers seem to be partially rationed by banks or prefer to not borrow solely from banks. On the contrary, pure informal borrowers owe to private parties for reasons other than being rationed. 20 Higher levels of financial literacy and trust in the banking sector can attract one to borrow from a bank. The effects for financial literacy are virtually the same as those we received from the Probit models. The subjective financial literacy matters only for those who claim the highest degree of expertise -they will avoid informal borrowing for sure. Mathematical skills and percentage calculation, as well as home accounting, also reduce the probability that one can borrow informally, yet these effects are not stable across specifications. This effect, however, does not work for those who choose between mixed-and pure bank-borrowing strategies.
Pure and Mixed Strategies
The new significant factor is increased trust in the banking sector. If one's confidence increased after the financial crisis of 2008, then the household will definitely ignore the informal market. This result is non-trivial, as the theory predicts that it is the depositors -not the borrowers -who should care about bank stability. However, given the fact that in Russia banks seem to be opaque and the regulators even had to introduce additional requirements aimed at increased disclosures in consumer loan contracts (real interest rates, all additional fees, repayment schedules, etc.), the trust may be related not to stability, but to beliefs in bank transparency and "good intentions". Surprisingly, the effect is quite the opposite for those who prefer a mixed strategy in favor of pure bank borrowing. The probability to be in this category is 30-50 percent higher if the borrower says that his trust in banks as a whole increased after the crisis.
As for credit discipline, it does not play an important role for pure informal borrowers. Our results suggest that "undisciplined" borrowers come to the market for bank loans from the group of the clients with a mixed strategy. For those of them who feel that it is not obligatory to repay the loan, the probability to be among pure bank clients -as opposed to mixed ones -is 15-20 percent higher.
Robustness Checks
To ensure that our results are sufficiently stable, we perform two types of robustness checks.
First of all, we replace the proxy for a household's financial position by another measure, namely the household's self-esteem. We introduce the variable est_welfare varying from 1 (very bad financial situation) to 5 (very good financial situation). The results of estimations for both the Probit and Multinomial Logit regressions are presented in tables A1-A3 in the Appendix. They confirm the rationing hypothesis, showing that those who owe to private parties demonstrate a worse financial situation, even if this situation is self-estimated. The same is true for financial 21 literacy: self-estimation does not have much influence, but better mathematical skills and home accounting reduces the probability that one will borrow from the informal market. The creditdiscipline effect is, however, very unstable in this model specification. As for comparing choices between pure and mixed strategies, the results confirm that rationing influences one's choosing a mixed strategy, and the choice of a pure private borrowing strategy is determined by financial literacy and trust in the banking sector.
Secondly, we reduce our sample by excluding households with the lowest incomes (mat_sit<3). These households are rationed by banks with the highest level of probability, so they may not have any choice as to the source of their debt financing. Sample restrictions allow us to avoid sample selection bias (if there is any), concentrating on those who are more likely to choose the market to borrow from themselves and who are less dependent on credit rationing problems. Tables A4-A6 in the Appendix show the results of this estimation. Not all models proved to be statistically significant, but those that are again provide support for our initial results. They show evidence for rationing, especially in choosing a mixed loan portfolio.
Financial literacy affects the choice between pure strategies, while the absence of credit discipline increases the probability that one will borrow from a bank.
Conclusion
This paper offers a possible explanation as to why the growing Russian market for consumer loans demonstrates high rates of non-performing loans and why simultaneously numerous borrowers are left aside and use the informal market, specifically borrow from private individuals like relatives, friends, colleagues, and so on.
An analysis of data obtained from the survey of Russian households in 2010 suggests that the informal sector, being an important source of borrowed funds, can compete with banks when households make borrowing decisions. Credit rationing is important: households turning to private lenders are not just those who cannot demonstrate a quality and stable financial situation and thus were denied by banks. However, this works only for those who combine bank credit with informal loans, so they are partially rationed. For pure informal lenders, it is not the economic factors that are important.
The data shows that, besides economic factors, other factors such as financial literacy and credit discipline are also significant when choosing a borrower's strategy. Bank clients are more often those households that show a high degree of financial literacy. But subjective financial 22 literacy -namely a household's self-esteem -does not explain much. Choosing a to borrow from a bank is explained by objective measures, like mathematical competence and home accounting.
Another important result that may serve -at least partly -as an explanation for pure quality of bank consumer loans is that those who owe to private parties demonstrate a higher degree of credit discipline. Those who believe that repaying a loan is not obligatory are less frequently found among informal borrowers, as they instead choose the bank credit market.
Finally, trust in the banking sector, undermined by the recent financial crisis, proves to influence a borrower's choice of the credit market. We show that an increase in this confidence can stimulate pure informal borrowers to enter the formal loan market.
Thus, our results show that, at least to some degree, economic characteristics of borrowers explain the low quality of bank consumer loans. A significant number of borrowers choose the informal market because of a lack of financial literacy and trust in the banking sector. On the other hand, those who do not show significant credit discipline prefer pure bank borrowing. 
